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**TOP SECRET**

9 September 1965

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# **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

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
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India-Pakistan: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

There has been no major change in the military situation, with heavy fighting continuing along the Punjab border.

The main thrust of the Indian ground offensive--the three-pronged drive toward Lahore--appears still to be stalled just inside the Pakistani border. Reports from New Delhi state that the Indian forces are being subjected to heavy Pakistani counterattacks. Neither side is claiming major successes in the area, although unconfirmed press reports quote a statement by a Pakistani officer in Lahore that the Indians have been pushed back across the border on the southern sector of the front.

The Indian attack from Rajasthan toward Hyderabad has moved about six miles, [REDACTED] This attack into the lightly defended Sind region of Pakistan may have been designed primarily to draw Pakistani forces away from the major battlefields of the Punjab.

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The Indians opened yet a third front yesterday, according to Defense Minister Chavan. Indian forces from the Jammu area have struck southward across the international border toward Sialkot, 15 miles away. The drive supplements the 6 September attack launched toward Sialkot from a point 30 miles north of Amritsar. The Pakistanis claim to have repulsed the earlier attack and to have taken a heavy toll of Indian armor, but Indian spokesmen report that the drive continues to progress steadily.

[Chavan declared in Parliament yesterday that the Indians do not visualize carrying the war into East Pakistan "at the present moment." The commanding general of India's Eastern Command told a US official yesterday that he had no orders from New Delhi to attack East Pakistan. Indian air attacks on Dacca and other East Pakistani targets on 7 September apparently were made without orders.]

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Naval forces were employed for the first time yesterday as Pakistani warships shelled a radar installation on the west coast of India some 200 miles southeast of Karachi. Rawalpindi alleges that the site was used to control air strikes against the Karachi area. New Delhi claims to have moved its own ships to positions from which to cut off the return to their Karachi base of the Pakistani units involved.

Both sides continue to claim victories in the air war, but reports of large numbers of aircraft downed or shot up on the ground are probably greatly exaggerated. [The Pakistani radio claimed last night that Indian paratroops were dropped near most major West Pakistani cities including Lahore, Karachi, and that relatively few

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A Pakistani spokesman asserts that a number of Indian "saboteurs" were dropped near various West Pakistani cities on 8 September.

designated for airborne

[No major outbreaks of Hindu-Muslim communal violence have been reported in either country, but the US Embassy in New Delhi comments that communal tensions there are close to the surface and that Embassy officers have seen several attacks on Muslims by Hindu crowds. Indian appeals for vigilance coupled with reported Pakistani paratroops have helped to heighten tensions.]

UN Secretary General Thant<sup>has</sup> arrived in Pakistan [early this morning] reportedly with "several suggestions" designed to end the fighting.

[Redacted] Pakistan's conditions for a cease-fire. These include a meaningful commitment to reopen the question of Kashmir's status, including a specific assurance that a plebiscite will be held. These terms are totally unacceptable to India.]

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[Iranian Prime Minister Hoveida left last night for Ankara to discuss Pakistan's request for military aid with the Turkish Government. The Iranian ambassador to Pakistan has told Ambassador McConaughy that Tehran will announce today its intention to lend some assistance, but that this will be mainly for effect and morale, and will not be of a military nature. Iran feels the gesture is necessary to prevent Pakistan from turning away from its Western ties. ]

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[ ] Turkey finds itself on the spot and will be forced to send help--even direct military support--if the situation becomes critical.]

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[ ] Indonesia will also come through with aid, and may even send aircraft. The Indonesian Supreme Operation Command was to have met last night to work out the details.]

Peking is pressing ahead with its campaign to shake Indian resolve and to step up deterrent pressure against further escalation of the war. The Chinese have followed up their menacing statement of 7 September with an open diplomatic note delivered on 8 September which restates the main points already made by Peking in harsh and explicit terms. These new threats implying the possibility of Chinese intervention may be followed by initiation of aggressive patrol action along the Sino-Indian frontier. Such essentially political actions could cause near panic in New Delhi and tie down substantial Indian forces. ]

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Indonesia: Communists are increasing their efforts to force the closing of the US consulate in Surabaya, East Java.

On 7 September a crowd of approximately 5,000 persons demanded that the government shut down the consulate and declare the US consul persona non grata. When the main demonstration broke up after several hours, a group remained in the consulate yard--reportedly relieved in relays--for the rest of the day and night. A similar demonstration was staged a month ago.

The demonstrations are being carried out under the auspices of the Communist-controlled National Front. Non-Communist groups, eager to prove their nationalistic and revolutionary fervor, have participated.

Considering the hostile atmosphere in Surabaya, the local police took surprisingly effective action during the latest demonstration to protect US personnel and consular property. In Djakarta, however, Foreign Minister Subandrio has made himself unavailable to the US ambassador.

[redacted] although no government plan existed for the closing of the consulate, President Sukarno might decide to close it should the Communists provoke enough irritation over the matter. [redacted]

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Egypt: The activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, a deeply entrenched reactionary organization, may again be posing a [serious] security problem for Nasir.

The regime has accused the Muslim Brotherhood of involvement in a series of recent civil disturbances and of planning actions designed to reduce Egypt to chaos. It claims that all important figures, including the US, Russian, French, and British ambassadors, were to be assassinated, and that factories, bridges, power plants, and radio stations were to be blown up. Although the Brotherhood has been largely dormant since 1954, it has remained strong underground and may be guilty of these activities.

Police investigations have allegedly uncovered Brotherhood cells throughout Egypt, and Presidential Adviser al-Khouli told the US Embassy that an "unbelievable" arsenal of arms and explosives has been smuggled into Egypt. Al-Khouli, attempting to minimize the appearance of domestic unrest, accused an unnamed Arab state of aiding the Brotherhood.

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Two Cairo papers have tried to link Brotherhood plotting with the case of Mustafa Amin, recently arrested as a US informant, to prove that colonialism, by implication notably the US, is the "architect of all conspiracies."

Recent demonstrations in Cairo at the funeral of a prerevolutionary premier and a recent incident of violence in Damietta suggest that there may be a reservoir of mass unrest. Rumors of plotting have flooded Cairo in recent weeks. Some dissatisfaction probably extends into the army. If the government fails to clamp down, or resorts to brutal measures of repression, the Brotherhood could win public sympathy and support, and be stimulated to further acts of violence.

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Nigeria: [In a major policy shift Nigeria has requested the establishment of a comprehensive US military training mission for the 10,000-man Nigerian Army.]

[Nigeria had previously terminated UK training activity and refused to receive even US mobile training teams, presumably in an effort to maintain its "nonaligned" image.]

[The US Embassy believes the sudden shift in position results partly from a deterioration of the army brought on by the too rapid elimination of British officers. It also cites the government's fear of leftist-inspired internal subversion and of possible military adventures by Ghana.]

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Congo: [The political struggle between President Kasavubu and Premier Tshombé is entering a new stage.]

[Kasavubu's decision to convene Parliament on 20 September was announced Monday. He had earlier contended that the constitution required that he demand Tshombé's resignation before Parliament met but said he would then name him as interim premier.]

25X1 [Tshombé now has decided he will refuse to resign, [redacted] He maintains that his transitional government must remain in power until presidential elections which are due six months after Parliament meets. He fears that his resignation and subsequent loss of parliamentary immunity might lead to his arrest.]

[In theory, the constitution gives Kasavubu the authority to dismiss the premier, but for the moment he appears to have no viable alternative to Tshombé. He has delayed the opening of Parliament for nearly three months in an effort to cut down Tshombé's political and popular strength. Despite suffering some tactical losses, the premier still appears to retain greater mass following than anyone else in the Congo.] [redacted]

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\*Dominican Republic: [General Elias Wessin y Wessin has agreed to accept a foreign assignment.]

[Wessin's action came last night after President Hector Garcia Godoy determined to reach an immediate solution to what he regarded as a case of clear insubordination by the General. Wessin had earlier failed to attend a meeting that Garcia Godoy had requested and told the press that he would not retire until an elected government was installed.]

[Garcia Godoy's offer of an overseas post to Wessin was backed by defense chief Francisco Rivera Caminero and other top armed forces leaders who have assured the provisional president of their determination to maintain military discipline.]

[Wessin's reassignment will stir some military discontent, particularly among officers of his recently abolished Armed Forces Training Center (CEFA). The support of Garcia Godoy's action by the top leaders and the relatively favorable attitude of other military commanders to the integration of CEFA into the army may indicate, however, that discontent will be limited. Nevertheless, the military chiefs have asked the Inter-American Peace Force to take "discreet precautions" at Wessin's San Isidro base.]

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\*Greece: Former premier Papandreou's rejection of National Radical Union (ERE) leader Kanellopoulos' modified offer to form an interim government ends the latest effort to solve the crisis.

Kanellopoulos' initial offer to form an ERE government and hold elections within 45 days met wide disapproval within the ERE itself. Probably as a way out for himself, Kanellopoulos subsequently modified these conditions to include a vote of confidence for an ERE government, which would then enact certain legislation prior to any elections. Papandreou, who agreed to the original ERE offer, has now reverted to his original demand for immediate elections under a caretaker government.

The breakdown of the Kanellopoulos-Papandreou negotiations will probably renew efforts to promote former deputy premier Stephanopoulos as head of a coalition government.

25X1 [redacted] former premier and ERE leader Constantine Karamanlis--now in self-exile in Paris--feels that the only solution is the establishment of a non-political government with a mandate to prepare constitutional reforms and other measures to be submitted to a referendum with elections to follow within about six months. He does not feel he would take part in the reorganization, but he would be willing to submit proposals for reforms.]

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\*USSR: [There are recurring reports that Soviet President Mikoyan will retire soon as part of a shuffle in the top Soviet leadership.]

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[Mikoyan's imminent retirement is the most prevalent of several recent Moscow rumors which reflect a general anticipation in diplomatic and press circles of change in the Soviet leadership.

Were Mikoyan to retire, the vacancy left would trigger a series of top level changes, but the rumors vary as to who would then fill what post. Some have Brezhnev taking over from Mikoyan, but are contradictory on whether he would also retain his hold on the party first secretaryship.

A plenary meeting of the party central committee has been expected but there is still no official announcement. Leadership changes would probably be confirmed at a Plenum prior to public announcement which might be made in connection with the Supreme Soviet session scheduled for 1 October. 25X1

[redacted]



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Congo-Sudan: [The Congolese Army and mercenary units stationed along the Sudanese border evidently are engaged in training and arming southern Sudanese dissidents, presumably to lessen the threat from Congo rebels in the Sudan. Khartoum has received frequent reports from its southern command of these activities by the Congolese Government, and evidently has suspected the US of complicity.]

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